10v | CR Book IV, Chapter 3

suffering from the rest of the world. Its rep-
ercussions may knot much of me together into
a temporary unity. Occasionally, the whole per-
son may seem absorbed in it.

Yet, with self-discipline, a self which has over-
come greed, hate and delusion, stands out - like
a trunk unmoved while leaves and branches flu-
tter. Pain, in some ways, indicates less a one-
ness, than a scattered and distracted condition
of the self, an inability to achieve a concen-
trated oneness.

Further, even if an enduring one-and-same-
ness could be inferred from the relatively
stable features mentioned in ch 2, that
which endures would, on analysis, in each case
be certainly less than the supposed total self,
and could not be equated with it. At most, our
more stable features may point to some kind
of bond among sections of the experienced
self. The contents of those sections are extre-
mely vague, and uncertain, a fact which may part-
ly enable them to pose as a total self.
But what would be the nature of that bond? We
are not entirely in error when we mistake our
shut-off state for internal unity. The source of
our apparent unity is, from one point of view,
an internal one, i.e. insofar as craving, or
greed, are inside us. Not because I am such and
such, do I want to keep together. But it is be-
cause there is a want, a craving, a desire to
keep together an ill-defined heap, that I think
that I am one. The empty want is the real basic
fact here. Without craving no selective oneness
or stability of any kind could be maintained.
What is with it is notbeing, but strives to be
because it is not.

A subsidiary cause of the total self is the
same wish to avoid mental effort by which
people attribute to Napoleon many events cont-
emporaneous with him. To say 'I do this' saves
the bother of determining the exact subject.

If we fare better when avoiding categories
which bring nothing but bewilderment, perplex-
ity & disputes, the 'whole and parts' should be
kept away from the interpretation of self-
experionce. These categories have a fairly
ascertainable meaning for objects in space,
where one can oppose a spatial inside to a