36d | CR Book XI, Chapter 4

arise or cease, originate or vanish, come or go. One ca-
nnot find anything ultimately real that makes or crea-
tes them. It is not good enough to say, "It does not
arise". Omitting the subject, "No ceasing, no arising; no
cutting off, no persisting; not one, not many; no coming
in, no going out." Analysis of conditions is driven for-
ward to this point on occasion of anything that dis-
turbs the free flow of prajñā. The free flow of our
original wisdom is then restored.

This view is as far from asserting the non-existence
of things as it is from asserting their existence. The
truth lies in between "is" and "is not". The commonsense
thing is not just flatly denied, but its appearance is
explained. It is not just taken as a final fact, but it
is transcended. It is there, but conditionally, not on
its own, as an unsatisfactory appearance.

Any process in its conditions involves an entire u-
niverse (II, 4, 30-38). In actual practice one cannot vi-
sualise the totality of conditions. A limit must be
set to the meditation on conditions. Where are we to

Unfolding the conditions of any appearance we con-
template the conditions of this selfhood (12 nidanas
B 187-198), the conditions of this experience (B 6 to 65
in 10 layers), and finally those of the object. It dep-
ends on our purpose how far we go in branching out in-
to these various classes of (antecedent and present, of
immediate and remote) conditions.

Aristotle sought out conditions for the sake of sat-
isfying the curious gaze of thoughtful contemplation.
Modern science, in an attempt to make the world
around us more tolerable and fit to live in, controls
one set of conditions by acting on another which is
invariably connected with it. Buddhists meditate on
conditions for the sake of salvation from all condit-
ioned things, qua conditioned. The conditioned as such
is to be pushed away, dissociated from the self in mind-
fulness, overcome by weakening the nidanas, rejected as con-
ditioned, and accepted, as not worth resisting.

In ordinary life we are so infatuated by sensible ap-
pearance, so trustful to designation, so given over to
outside objects, as to (potential or actual) sources of